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JOSEPH NYE, JR.: UNDERSTANDING
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS
STUDY GUIDE, 2002-2009
Steven Alan Samson
CHAPTER ONE: IS THERE AN ENDURING LOGIC OF
CONFLICT IN WORLD POLITICS?
Outline
A.

B.

WHAT IS INTERNATIONAL POLITICS? (3-4)
1.
World Imperial System
a.
Western: Roman, Spanish, French, British
b.
Regional Empires: Sumerian, Persian, Chinese
2.
Feudal System
a.
Crosscutting, Non-Territorial Loyalties and Conflicts
3.
Anarchic System of States
a.
Examples
1)
City-States
2)
Dynastic Territorial States
b.
Absence of a Common Sovereign
1)
Self-Help System
2)
Thomas Hobbes: State of Nature
c.
Domestic (Municipal) vs. International Politics and Law
1)
Domestic Monopoly on the Use of Force vs. International
Anarchy
2)
Domestic Sense of Community vs. Absence of a Common
Loyalty
3)
Result: Gap between Order and Justice
4.
This Last System Is the Most Relevant to Contemporary International Politics
TWO VIEWS OF ANARCHIC POLITICS (4-8)
1.
Political Philosophy: Two Views
a.
Thomas Hobbes: Emphasis on Insecurity, Force, and Survival
b.
John Locke: People Can Make Contracts
2.
International Politics: Two Current Views
a.
Realism is the dominant tradition; it is more pessimistic: Hans
Morgenthau was a leading theorist
b.
Liberalism (often called idealism), the more optimistic tradition, traces
back to Baron Montesquieu, Immanuel Kant, Jeremy Bentham, John
Stuart Mill, and Woodrow Wilson
3.
Presuppositions
a.
Liberals emphasize economic and social interdependence
(1)
They see a global society that functions alongside the states
and sets part of the context for states (e.g., trade, the UN)
b.
Realists claim liberals overstate the difference between domestic and
international politics
4.
Realist Rejoinder: “A State of War Does Not Mean Constant War”
a.
Sidebar: 1910
5.
Resurgence of Liberal Claims in the 1970s and 1980s
a.
Richard Rosecrance: States can increase their power either
aggressively by territorial conquest or peacefully through trade

(1)
Illustration: Japan
Ecological Interdependence: Vision of a World Without Borders
a.
Ozone depletion
b.
AIDS and drugs
c.
Richard Falk: non-territorial loyalty
d.
Transnational forces are undoing the Peace of Westphalia
7.
Realist Rebuttal
8.
Other Approaches
a.
Marxism
b.
Dependency Theory [Cardoso changed to a free market view and
served as the Brazilian president]
c.
Kenneth Waltz: Neo-realism
d.
Robert Keohane: Neo-liberalism
9.
Constructivists
a.
Concepts are socially constructed [cf. medieval nominalism,
deconstruction, and Chomsky’s deep structures]
b.
Focus on instrumental rationality
c.
John Maynard Keynes’ dead scribblers
BUILDING BLOCKS (8-12)
1.
Actors
a.
States
b.
Non-state actors
(1)
TNCs or MNCs (multinational corporations)
c.
Middle East as an Illustration
(1)
MNCs
(2)
IGOs (intergovernmental organizations)
(3)
NGOs (non-governmental organizations)
(4)
Transnational ethnic groups such as the Kurds
2.
Goals
a.
National security
3.
Instruments
a.
Stanley Hoffmann: Link between military strength and positive
achievement has been loosened
b.
Reasons
(1)
Nuclear weapons
(2)
Expense of conventional forces
(3)
Internal constraints
(4)
Alternatives to Force
c.
Basic game of security goes on
(1)
Hegemonic states
(2)
Hegemonic wars
(3)
New treaty sets the new framework of order: e.g., the Treaty of
Utrecht, 1713; the Congress of Vienna, 1815; and the United
Nations system, 1945
THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR (12)
1.
Thucydides: The Father of Realism
a.
Strategos=general
A SHORT VERSION OF A LONG STORY (12-15)
1.
Initial Alliance of the Greece City-States during the Persians Wars
2.
Athenian Empire
a.
Delian League
3.
Civil War in Epidamnus
a.
Democrats sought help from Corcyra [the metropolis=mother city] but
were turned down
b.
Democrats turned to Corinth, an Athenian rival, but the Corcyreans sent
a fleet to recapture their former colony and defeated the Corinthian fleet
6.

C.

D.

E.

c.
Corinth declared war and Corcyra turned to Athens for help
Athenian Dilemma: Break truce or allow a shift in the power balance?
a.
Athenians pursued a deterrence strategy: show of force against Corinth
did not succeed in forcing Corinth to back down
b.
Corinth stirred up problems in Potidaea, which was an Athenian ally
c.
Sparta had promised aid to Corinth if Athens attacked Potidaea
d.
Athens sent forces to put down an uprising
5.
Great Debate in Sparta
a.
Spartans voted in favor of war in order maintain the balance of power
by checking the increase of Athenian power
6.
War (431-404 BC)
a.
Peace of Nicias
b.
Disastrous Sicilian Expedition
c.
Four Hundred Oligarchs
d.
Athenian Defeat
CAUSES AND THEORIES (15-18)
1.
What Made War Inevitable
2.
Pericles
3.
Athens’ Security Dilemma
a.
Security dilemmas are characteristic of anarchic organization
4.
Prisoner’s Dilemma
a.
Cooperation
b.
Issues of Trust and Credibility
5.
Balance of Naval Power
6.
Question of Cheating
INEVITABILITY AND THE SHADOW OF THE FUTURE (18-20)
1.
Belief in War’s Inevitability as a Cause
2.
Robert Axelrod
a.
Tit-for-Tat strategy
3.
Belief in the Inevitability of War Is Corrosive in International Politics
a.
If you suspect your opponent will cheat, you rely on yourself
4.
Thucydides’ View of Human Nature
a.
Donald Kagan contends that Thucydides erred; Sparta feared a slave
revolt more than it feared Athens
b.
Kagan’s Conclusion: Precipitating Causes – Policy Mistakes by the Chief Actors
– Were More Important
6.
Modern Lessons
a.
Be aware of both regularities and changes
b.
Beware of patently shallow historical analogies
c.
Be aware of the selectivity of historians
d.
Historians are affected by their contemporary concerns; consequently the
questions they ask change
7.
The Cure to Misunderstanding History Is to Read More, Not Less
ETHICAL QUESTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (19-20)
1.
Uses of Moral Arguments
a.
They move and constrain people
(1)
e.g., Corcyra’s appeal
b.
They are used rhetorically as propaganda to disguise less elevated
motives
(1)
e.g., the Melian Debate
2.
The Basic Touchstone for Moral Arguments Is Impartiality
3.
Kantian Tradition (deontological emphasizes duties and rules) vs. the Utilitarian
Tradition (consequentialist); some add Virtue Ethics (aretaic)
4.
Moral Arguments Can Be Judged in Three Ways:
a.
Motives or intentions involved
b.
Means used
4.

F.

G.

H.

I.

J.

c.
Consequences or net effects
LIMITS ON ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (20-22)
1.
Weak International Consensus on Values
2.
Different Standards of Behavior: Private vs. Public
a.
Collective abstractions like the State not held to the same standard
3.
Complexity of Causation
a.
Oxford Union debate, 1933
b.
Hamburger argument
4.
Order and Justice Are Both Important
a.
Absence of institutions to preserve the order that precedes justice
THREE VIEWS OF THE ROLE OF MORALITY (23-28)
1.
Skeptics
a.
Example: Thucydides
(1)
Melian Debate: might makes right
b.
Morality Requires Choice
c.
Criticisms: Some Choices
(1)
Thomas Hobbes: balance of power
(2)
International law and customs
(3)
International organizations
d.
Just War Doctrine in Wartime
(1)
Answer to pacifism
e.
Why Complete Skepticism May Be Rejected
f.
Realists Who Are Not Complete Skeptics
(1)
Emphasis on order
(2)
Moral crusades disrupt balances of power [cf. Hobbes]
g.
Tradeoffs between Order and Justice
2.
State Moralists
a.
Example: Michael Walzer
(1)
States represent the pooled rights of individuals
b.
A Society of States with Certain Rules
(1)
Sovereignty: Good fences make good neighbors
(2)
Frequent violations
c.
Intervention is a long-standing problem
(1)
Examples of Panama and Kuwait
3.
Cosmopolitans
a.
Need to focus on distributive justice
(1)
Problem of the “brain drain”
b.
National boundaries have no moral standing
c.
Limited cosmopolitan view looks at people’s multiple loyalties:
pluralism
4.
Strengths and Weaknesses of Each Approach
a.
Trade-Offs
b.
Outrage May Lead to Heightened Risk
c.
The issues recur throughout history

Study Questions
1.

What Is International Politics? Identify three basic forms of world politics. Identify the chief
varieties of the anarchic system of states. What does the author mean by calling international
politics “a self-help system?” What is life like in Thomas Hobbes’s state of nature? Identify two
ways international law differs from domestic law? With what result? (3-4)

2.

Two Views of Anarchic Politics Identify the two major traditions in thinking about international
politics that in some ways began with Hobbes and Locke. Who are some of the leading
exponents of each? What is the central perception of each? What are some of the arguments

pro and con? Identify five other approaches. How do constructivists differ from neorealists and
neoliberals? What is the practical importance of theories? (4-8)
3.

Building Blocks Identify three concepts that are basic to theorizing about international politics.
How is each concept changing? (For example, actors include not only states but also IGOs,
NGOs, and transnational ethnic groups). Identify three changes in the role of force. What other
factors may play a larger role than force? How is the balance of power supposed to work?
What are hegemonic wars and how are they resolved? (8-12)

4.

The Peloponnesian War Summarize the key events and circumstances that led to the Second
Peloponnesian War. What was Athens’s dilemma? (12-14)

5.

Causes and Theories What did Thucydides believe caused the war? What was the view of
Pericles? What is a security dilemma? What is the Prisoner’s Dilemma scenario in game
theory? What was Athens’s security dilemma, as described by the Corcyraeans? (15-17)

6.

Inevitability and the Shadow of the Future What does Robert Axelrod believe to be the most
effective strategy in Prisoner’s Dilemma? What does it take to develop trust? (Trust is the title of
a recent book by Francis Fukuyama). Compare Donald Kagan’s view of the precipitating causes
with Thucydides’s theory of inevitability. What three lessons may be drawn from this ancient
history. How did Thucydides’s questions differ from those we might ask today? (17-20)

7.

Ethical Questions and International Poliics How may moral arguments be used? What views
did the Athenians and Melians take in 416 BC? With what result (p. 22)? Contrast the Kantian
(natural or intrinsic ethical norms) with the utilitarian (constructivist or consequentialist ethical
norms) tradition. Identify three ways moral arguments may be judged. (20-22)

8.

Limits on Ethics in International Relations Identify four reasons why ethics plays less of a role
in international than in domestic politics. Why is the “hamburger argument” unsound? (22-23)

9.

Three Views of the Role of Morality Identify three different views of ethics in international
relations. Which views do realists tend to take? Idealists? Give three reasons why the argument
of skeptics is inadequate. According to Thomas Hobbes, what does escaping the state of
nature require? What role may be played by international law and customs? International
organizations? What takes priority: justice or order? What is the problem with moral crusades?
(23-26)

10.

What are the chief considerations for state moralists? What circumstances might justify
intervention? What are the chief considerations for cosmopolitans? What is distributive
justice? What are the strengths and weaknesses of each view? What is the place of morality?
[In the Morgenthau reading later, we will consider the issue of morality from a classical realist
perspective]. What has changed since the time of Thucydides? (26-28)

Review
world imperial system
feudalism
anarchy
city-states
territorial dynasties
anarchic system of states
international politics as a self-help system
balance of power
hegemonic state
nonstate actor
NGOs, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs)
Thomas Hobbes' state of nature
John Locke
Immanuel Kant
Jeremy Bentham
Athens's security dilemma
moral crusades
strategos (general)
Thucydides
Pericles
Prisoner's Dilemma
Second Peloponnesian War
Corinthians
Epidamnians
Melians (Melian dialogue)
Corcyraeans
realism
reasons ethics plays less of a role in international than domestic politics

dependency theory
views of the role of morality
cosmopolitans

liberalism
constructivism
skeptics
state moralists
three basic forms of world politics

CHAPTER TWO: ORIGINS OF THE GREAT TWENTIETHCENTURY CONFLICTS
Study Questions
1.

International Systems and Levels of Causation What is an international system? What are
some of its intangible aspects? In light of the issue of morality (p. 28), why are the unintended
consequences of a system (such as the market system) important? How did the existing
international system affect Bolshevik behavior? [Revolutionaries sometimes refer to the pattern
as “co-optation,” which justifies destroy existing institutions]. What is the geopolitical view of the
distribution of power among states, as understood by Kautilya and Machiavelli? What accounts
for a checkerboard pattern?
(33-35)

2.

Levels of Analysis Identify three levels of analysis. What does Nye mean by
overprediction? What is William Occam’s rule of parsimony? (35-37)

3.

Systems: Structure and Process Kenneth Waltz’s concept focuses on what aspect of
a system? How does polarity affect the structure of a system? What three elements
determine the process of an international system? (37-38)

4.

Revolutionary and Moderate Goals and Instruments What factors do constructivists
take into account? What were the rules of the game in the eighteenth century (a period
defined in part by the Treaty of Utrecht)? Why did states’ goals change? How did the
Napoleonic Wars change the process? What makes the French Revolution exogenous
to a structural theory? How did technology change the means? (38-39)

5.

The Structure and Process of the Nineteenth-Century System What changes
resulted from the Congress of Vienna? When did the big change occur? Why did it not
produce instability? What changes do constructivists point out? (39-42)

6.

A Modern Sequel How has the German problem changed over the years? What made
possible Germany’s reunification? Identify three ways things have changed. (42-43)

7.

Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy How may the beginning of the Peloponnesian
War, the onset of the Austro-Hungarian War, and the end of the Cold War be understood
at the level of domestic politics? How did Karl Marx and classical liberals like Richard
Cobden view the relationship between capitalism and war or peace? How well did
Marxist and liberal theories account for the onset of the First World War and other events
based on domestic politics? (43-44)

8.

Liberalism Revived Why were liberal theories discredited? What are the four strands of
recent liberal thinking? Why is trade important? Illustrate with the case of Japan in the
1930s, as noted by Eugene Staley, and recently. According to neoliberals, why do
international organizations matter? How do institutions stabilize expectations? What did
Karl Deutsch mean by “pluralistic security communities?” What circumstances might
cause security dilemmas to reemerge in Europe? (44-47)

9.

Liberal Democracy and War According to Michael Doyle, why do liberal democracies

not fight other liberal democracies? How does a plebiscitary democracy differ from a
liberal democracy?
10.

Definition of National Interests Compare and contrast the realist and liberal views.
(46)

11.

Variations in Foreign Policies Besides trade and democracy, what other factors in their
Domestic affairs may explain different foreign policies? (47-50)

12.

PowerPoint: The five crises of national development in the model developed by
Michael Roskin are identity, legitimacy, penetration, participation, and distribution.
1) Identity: tribalism, unassimilated minorities
2) Legitimacy: dynastic conflicts, rebellions
3) Penetration: poor integration, political and financial corruption
4) Participation: electoral turmoil, one-party dominance, voter apathy or discrimination
5) Distribution: class struggle, social and economic democracy
Most emerging or developing countries are still trying to develop a national identity and unifying
common culture of some sort. Many seek to redirect tribal loyalties to the central government and
integrate (or oppress) unassimilated minorities. But the title of Samuel P. Huntington's last book,
Who Are We?, shows that even a developed country like the United States is wrestling with this
problem. Second: Are there disaffected groups that call into question the legitimacy of the
regime? Mass public education and ethnic cleansing are rather different responses to the same
crisis. Third: How effectively does the regime's rule extend over its territory? Does it assert
effective sovereignty? Fourth: How well are people able to register their political views and
demands? Are elections frequently accompanied or followed by riots or boycotts? Finally: How
effectively, on the one hand, does the regime protect life, liberty, and property, and help
regularize commerce within a civil society? On the other hand, how much does the regime favor
some groups or classes of people over others and attempt to redistribute life's chances, including
property and opportunities? This is a continuing problem for all regimes. Poorly-integrated
countries are stuck in the third crisis. But to some degree, kleptocracy (rule by thieves) is a
common problem everywhere. Transparency International evaluates the levels of corruption and
relative transparency of countries around the world.

13.

Counterfactuals What are they? How may they be used to define causal claims?
Identify four criteria that can be used to test counterfactual thought experiments. (50-53)

Review
system
Richard Cobden
Kautilya
Prisoner's Dilemma
Prince Metternich
Congress of Vienna
strands of liberal thinking
1870 unification of Germany
Otto von Bismarck
overprediction
Occam's razor
rule of parsimony
neoliberals
expectations of stability
liberal democracies
plebiscitary democracies
structure and process
levels of analysis
Marxist and liberal views of the relationship between war and capitalism
poorly integrated countries
Japan's behavior in the 1930s Eugene Staley
ideologies of nationalism and democracy
Michael Doyle
low-level generalization about variations in foreign policy
counterfactual
examples of revolutionary goals and instruments
the idea of popular sovereignty as spread by Napoleon through Europe
Frederick the Great's seizure of Silesia from Maria Theresa
the French use of the levée en masse instead of mercenaries
the once popular notion in France that all monarchs should be executed

Wars of German Unification (PowerPoint Slides): Review
Carl von Clausewitz
Austria

Neville Chamberlain
France

Denmark
Otto von Bismarck

CHAPTER THREE: BALANCE OF POWER AND WORLD WAR
I
Study Questions
1.

Balance of Power Compare and contrast David Hume’s, Richard Cobden’s, and Woodrow
Wilson’s ideas about the balance of power. Following the unprecedented Thirty Years War
(1618-1648), the nine hegemonic wars that followed the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) were: the
War of the League of Augsburg (1689-1697); the War of the Spanish Succession (17021713); the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748); the Seven Years War (also the Third
Silesian War, 1756-1763); the War of American Independence (1775-1763); the War of the
First Coalition against France (1792-1797); the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815); the First World
War (1914-1918); and
the Second World War (1939-1945). Why do states balance power? (58-59)

2.

Power Define: power, power conversion, power resources, hard power vs. soft
power. How has power been transformed in the age of information-based economies
and transnational interdependence? (59-62)

3.

Balances as Distributions of Power Identify three meanings of balance of power.
What is the hegemonic stability theory? [Its opposite is the hegemonic transition
theory]. What dog did not bark in 1895 [over disputed territorial claims between
Venezuela and British Guiana]? (62-63)

4.

Balance of Power as Policy How did Lord Palmerston and Winston Churchill articulate
and Sir Edward Grey practice the policy of balancing? What is bandwagoning? Why is
it risky in international politics? Identify five reasons countries join the stronger rather
than the weaker side. (63-65)

5.

Balance of Power as Multipolar Systems What are the distinguishing features of a
classical balance of power system? How did the balance of power system following
German unification break down? Identify five periods in the nineteenth-century balance
of power system [known as the Pax Britannica]. (65-67)

6.

Alliances Why are alliances form and why do they collapse? What were the hallmarks
of Bismarck’s alliance system? (67-68)

7.

The Origins of World War I Identify some of the major international consequences of
the First World War. (68-69)

8.

Three Levels of Analysis What were the two key structural changes at the systems
level of analysis? What role was played by: the Tirpitz Plan, the Boer War, the Crowe
memorandum? When did Britain stop playing the critical role of balancer (maintainer of
the balance of power)? What was the effect of the Triple Entente? Identify four
changes in the process? [Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn has a different insight into the “Dear
Nicky” letter, noting that Nicholas was deceived by two of his generals]. [Correction:
Herbert Spencer articulated the “survival of the fittest” philosophy]. (69-71)

9.

Why does Lenin’s imperialist theory fail to explain what happened at Fashoda in 1898?
Who was threatened by the rise of nationalism in the Balkans and why? Why did the Coalition
of Rye and Iron favor German expansionism? How did the personalities of Franz Josef, Count
Berchtold, Nicholas II, and Wilhelm II contribute to the tragedy? (71-74)

10.

Was War Inevitable? What were the deep causes of the First World War? The
intermediate causes? The precipitating cause? What was the Schlieffen Plan?
What possibly would have made its assumptions obsolete by 1916? (74-77)

11.

What Kind of War? Counterfactually, what four other wars were possible? [Incidentally,
United States entry into the war came shortly after the British intercepted the
Zimmermann note, which offered Mexico incentives to ally itself with Germany if the
Americans entered the war]. What three lessons does the author draw? (77-81)

APPENDICES: OTHER TAKES ON THESE ISSUES
1.

Eyre Crowe, Memorandum, January 1, 1907

Either Germany is definitely aiming at a general political hegemony and maritime
ascendancy, threatening the independence of her neighbours and ultimately the
existence of England; Or Germany, free from any such clear-cut ambition, and thinking
for the present merely of using her legitimate position and influence as one of the
leading Powers in the council of nations, is seeking to promote her foreign commerce,
spread the benefits of German culture, extend the scope of her national energies, and
create fresh German interests all over the world wherever and whenever a peaceful
opportunity offers. . . . It will, however, be seen, upon reflection, that there is no actual
necessity for a British Government to determine definitely which of the two theories of
German policy it will accept. For it is clear that the second scheme (of semiindependent evolution, not entirely unaided by statecraft) may at any stage merge into
the first, or conscious-design scheme. Moreover, if ever the evolution scheme should
come to be realized, the position thereby accruing to Germany would obviously
constitute as formidable a menace to the rest of the world as would be presented by any
deliberate conquest of a similar position by “malice aforethought.”
2.

Donald Kagan

Bismarck’s unification of the Germans under the leadership of Prussia was an
astonishing achievement. His ability to solidify the place of the new and threatening
entity in a European system shattered by its emergence and to create a new
international order in which Germany could live in peace and prosper may have been
even more remarkable. For the two decades after 1871 that he remained in power
there were no wars among the great powers. Even after he was dismissed in 1890 by
the new German emperor, William II, it took his successors another quarter of a century
to undo and reverse his policies and so distort the system he created as to produce a
major war.
Bismarck’s second great achievement rested, in part, on Germany’s strong military and
industrial power, which gave his policies weight and respect. . . . Central to his goal was

the need to convince the other powers that Germany was what he repeatedly asserted:
a “saturated” power that needed to turn inward to consolidate in peace what had been
gained in three swift wars.
[Following the dismissal of Bismarck in 1890, the first and most important part of
Bismarck’s system to be sacrificed was a flexible accommodation (the Reinsurance
Treaty) with the Russians that kept them isolated from France and kept Germany from
becoming too closely linked to Austrian ambitions. A few years later the two-front
Schlieffen Plan grew in response to a Franco-Russian alliance that Bismarck had so
skillfully prevented].
3.

David W. Ziegler

German preparation for war followed the Schlieffen Plan, which rested on several
assumptions. One was that any major war in Europe would be for the Germans a twofront war, against Russia in the east and France in the west. Another assumption was
that the huge Russian army would be impossible to defeat; the most the Germans could
hope to do would be to keep the Russian army from defeating them. The one
advantage that the Germans had, the Schlieffen Plan assumed, was technological
superiority, particularly the ability to mobilize quickly. They assumed they could
mobilize in two weeks; the Russians, with more territory and a less-developed railroad
network, would need six weeks. Therefore, the Schlieffen Plan called for a major
offensive first against France, to knock it out of the war before turning the German army
to the more difficult task of fighting the Russian army. For this reason, the Russian
mobilization was greeted with alarm in Berlin. If the Schlieffen Plan were to work (and
for all practical purposes it was the only plan the Germans had), then it was essential
that the Germans begin mobilizing as soon as the Russians did. Otherwise they would
lose the advantage afforded them by their superior technology. Never mind that the
Russian mobilization was directed against Austria. The crucial factor, in German eyes,
was mobilization.
Thus when the Germans in their turn delivered an ultimatum to Russia on July 31,
demanding that they demobilize, it was not so much in defense of Austria as in defense
of their own strategic situation. When Russia declined to demobilize, the Germans
mobilized. The French, realizing what was coming, did so too. . . .
The connecting thread, from the assassination in Sarajevo to the German attack on
France, was military planning.
4.

Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn:

[At the end of the war the Reichstag appointed a commission to determine responsibility
for the war. Dr. Arthur Rosenberg, a Social Democrat who headed the commission,
exonerated Wilhelm II almost completely. Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn describes the
emperor as] a gifted but rather loud-mouthed and most undiplomatic ruler. . . . He was a

victim of too much adulation and misinformation, but was by no means a villain, as
Walter Rathenau has pointed out. . . .
Harry Elmer Barnes, an American historian who tried to assess the guilt for this silliest
of all major wars, named Serbia first, Russia second, Austria-Hungary third, France
fourth, the German Reich fifth, and Britain sixth. What could have been a local
intervention by Austria-Hungary against Serbia was transformed into a pan-European
war by the actions of two Russians, War Minister Sukhomlinov and General
Yanushyévich, chief of the Russian general staff. They lied constantly to their emperor
about their mobilization not only along the Austrian, but also along the German frontier.
An exchange of telegrams between “Willy” and “Nicky” (unfortunately, there was no “hot
line” yet) caused the Kaiser to believe that his cousin and friend was trying to deceive
him. He thereupon declared war on Russia. (Footnote: The Bolsheviks tried
Yanushkievitch and Sukhomlinov in 1918 – at that time a fair trial was still possible.
Both insisted that they had acted as patriots. In retrospect it become clear that they
acted less as patriots than as faithful servants of France. Lord Grey was very right
when he wrote: “Let it never be forgotten that it was the energy and tremendous
sacrifice with which Russia made this advance [i.e. into East Prussia] that saved the
Allies in the summer of 1914. . . . The whole-hearted efforts and all the strength of
Russia were needed in the early stages to save the Allies”). Russia was tied to France
by a military alliance; and thus began a war that could have been ended by a
compromise as late as 1917, which would have saved us the misery Europe has been
living in ever since. But the American intervention made compromise impossible. The
Germans, most of the time victorious in this war about Austria-Hungary, were forced to
their knees primarily by the hunger blockade.
Appendices Review
two theories of German policy
war guilt

Bismarck’s achievements

hazards of the Schlieffen Plan

Nye Review
David Hume
Woodrow Wilson
Richard Cobden
Sir Edward Grey
Lord Palmerston
power conversion
hard power
power resources
soft power
1815-1822: the Concert of Europe
1822-1854: the rise of nationalism and democracy
1854-1870: nationalism and the unification of Italy and Germany Count Berchtold
1870-1890: Bismarck's Revived Concert
Emperor Franz Josef
causes of World War I: key factors at the individual and structural levels of analysis
Kaiser Wilhelm II
Czar Nicholas II
confrontation at Fashoda
Germany's Coalition of Rye and Iron
corruption of the Ottoman government
complacency about peace
rise of German power
rigidity of the alliance system
rise of nationalism
Austria's desire to prevent disintegration
hegemonic stability theory
Tirpitz Plan
Schlieffen Plan
bandwagoning phenomenon
balance of power strategy
Bismarck's alliance system

CHAPTER FOUR: THE FAILURE OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY
AND WORLD WAR II

Study Questions
1.

The League of Nations What change was Woodrow Wilson determined to introduce into the
international system (which is reflected in his famous 14 Points)? Identify the three major points
of the collective security system? Identify three ways in which it differed from the balance of
power approach. What were some of the ambiguities in the Covenant of the League of Nations?
What was its understanding of international law? (85-88)

2.

The United States and the League of Nations [American opponents of the Versailles
Treaty were divided into two camps: reservationists and irreconcilables]. Henry Cabot
Lodge, a political ally of the late Theodore Roosevelt, led the reservationists.
[Intellectual animosity long characterized the relationship between Wilson and Lodge].
(88-89)

3.

The Early Days of the League What did the French want? The British? Why did the
French form alliances with Poland and the Little Entente? What was the state of
Germany after the war? How did the Versailles Treaty make things worse? Why were
the Italians unhappy with the peace (consider the Treaty of London)? What
commitments did Germany make in the Treaty of Locarno? What was the Kellogg-Briand
Pact? (89-90)

4.

The Manchurian Failure, the Ethiopian Debacle Why did collective security fail in
Manchuria and Ethiopia? [Discrimination against Japan by the United States in the
Washington Conference’s 5:5:3:1:1 formula for postwar naval size was also a sore point].
Why did the sanctions against Italy finally take a back seat in 1936? [The Haitian
delegate showed a real understanding of Thomas Hobbes’s point about equality in the
state of nature]. (90-93)

5.

Hitler’s War? How was the German problem solved after the Second World War? What
kind of war did Hitler want? What is the significance of the Hossbach memorandum?
(93-95)

6.

Hitler’s Strategy What were Hitler’s four options when he came to power in 1933?
Identify the four phases in which he pursued the fourth option. How did Hitler
outmaneuver his foes at Stresa and in the Rhineland? [The Anschluss is the name given
Hitler’s seizure of Austria in 1938]. What excuse did Hitler use to justify seizing the
Sudetenland? The Munich Conference is now synonymous with the word
“appeasement” (see pp. 107-08). Hitler’s “brilliant diplomatic coup” (p. 97) was the
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, an alliance of two predatory regimes. The seizure of western
Poland in September 1939 was followed by the “Phony War,” which lasted until May.
But neither the Russians, who had seized eastern Poland in mid-September, nor the
Germans were quiet. Russia annexed the Baltic states, then invaded Finland at the end
of November, resulting in its expulsion from the League of Nations. The Phony War
became a shooting war in the West when the Germans seized Denmark and Norway in
April and then launched the Blitzkrieg against the Low Countries and France in May. All
through this period Hitler monopolized the initiative; his foes merely reacted. The real
issue is: Why did Hitler finally fail? (95-98)

7.

The Role of the Individual What aspects of Hitler’s personality brought on global war
and failure? How did he misjudge the United States? (98-99)

8.

Systemic and Domestic Causes At the structural level, what made the Versailles
Treaty too harsh and too lenient at the same time (here analogies might be made with
the conclusion of the Gulf War)? Identify three domestic-level changes. Food for

thought: What domestic-level factors shape American policy today? How do the
various causes fit together? (99-101)
9.

Was War Inevitable? What might the Western democracies have done differently?
When did war become virtually inevitable? (102-03)

10.

The Pacific War What was the economic and political context in which Japan began
to impose its East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere? After Japan’s seizure of French Indochina
following the fall of France, what three options could the militarists have exercised? Why
did they choose to move against the United States? B How did the three levels of
analysis work together? (99-103)

11.

Appeasement and Two Types of War In the author’s judgment, when was
appeasement appropriate? Inappropriate? (103-04)
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war-guilt clause
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE COLD WAR
Study Questions
1.

Deterrence and Containment Distinguish between deterrence and containment. Give
examples of each. (112-13)

2.

Three Approaches to the Cold War Identify the three main schools of opinion on the causes
of the Cold War. What evidence does each school of opinion cite in favor of its view? How do
hard revisionists differ from soft revisionists? Basically, what view does John Lewis Gaddis
take today? (114-16)

3.

Roosevelt’s Policies, Stalin’s Policies Why did Roosevelt demand unconditional surrender?
What are some examples of Soviet pragmatism during the war? (116-18)

4.

Phases of the Conflict Identify the six issues that contributed to the eventual change
from Roosevelt’s strategy to the onset of the Cold War. What happened to the lend-lease aid
program? From Kennan’s and Litvinov’s perspectives, why would appeasement have failed to
work? What did Kennan object to in the Truman Doctrine? What was the rationale for the
Marshall Plan? What caused Truman finally to sign NSC-68 in June 1950? (118-23)

5.

Levels of Analysis What did Alexis de Tocqueville predict (in 1835)?

There are at the present time two great nations in the world, which started from
different points, but seem to tend towards the same end. I allude to the Russians

and the Americans. . . . All other nations seem to have nearly reached their
natural limits, and they have only to maintain their power; but these are still in the
act of growth. All the others have stopped, or continue to advance with extreme
difficulty; these alone are proceeding with ease and celerity along a path to which
no limited can be perceived. . . . The American struggles against the obstacles
which nature opposes to him; the adversaries of the Russian are men. The
former combats the wilderness and savage life; the latter, civilization with all its
arms. The Anglo-American relies upon personal interest to accomplish his ends,
and gives free scope to the unguided strength and common sense of the people;
the Russian centres all the authority of society in a single arm. The principal
instrument of the former is freedom; of the latter, servitude. Their starting-point is
different, and their courses are not the same; yet each of them seems marked
out by the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe.” -- Democracy
in America, vol. 1
What changed between the two powers after the war? What were the two roots of Soviet
foreign policy? Identify four peculiarities of Russian political culture. What did the
communist system add? Identify four peculiarities of American political culture. How has
the affected the American foreign policy process [which is often described as oscillating
between introversion and extroversion]? (123-27)
6.

U.S. and Soviet Goals in the Cold War Distinguish between possession goals and
milieu goals. How did Soviet expansionism differ from Hitler’s? Is there evidence of a
more threatening nature? What was George Kennan’s idea of containment? What
was the rationale for American aid to Yugoslavia? What change after the Korean War?
What were some signs of a thaw in the Cold War after Stalin’s death? Why did
Khrushchev’s approach fail? What was détente? How did the Nixon Administration
make use of it as a means to pursue the goals of containment? Identify three trends in
the 1970s that undercut it? (127-31)

7.

The End of the Cold War Identify some of the explanations for the end of the Cold War.
Why was an individual, Mikhail Gorbachev, the most important precipitating cause? [A
case can be made for adding Ronald Reagan]. How did Gorbachev’s policies, glasnost,
perestroika, and the new thinking, contribute to the Soviet collapse? [The 1980s arms
race also contributed]. What was the role of liberal ideas and what Paul Kennedy calls
imperial overstretch? What are some of the evidences of a loss of legitimacy?
Identify some deeper consequences of de-Stalinization in 1956, repressive measures in
the Soviet empire, and Soviet incompetence in face of the creative destruction (Joseph
Schumpeter’s term) of capitalism? What were the effects of IMF shock therapy? (131-36)

8.

Physics and Politics What was the Baruch Plan? Identify five significant political
effects of the H-bomb. (136-39)

9.

Balance of Terror, Problems of Nuclear Deterrence What made bipolarity a
particularly stable type of system? What is the reasoning behind nuclear deterrence
(especially in the context of a second-strike capability)? What accounts for early self-restraint?
(139-41)

10.

The Cuban Missile Crisis Identify various views that attempt to account for the peaceful
resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis. What were the American options? How did its
resolution a compromise? (141-43)

11.

How could nuclear war fit the just war theory? What are some of the continuing

concerns about the potential use of nuclear weapons? (143-46)
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CHAPTER SIX: INTERVENTION, INSTITUTIONS, REGIONAL
AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS
Study Questions
1.

Ethnic Conflicts, Intervention and Sovereignty Identify: ethnic wars, failed states. Why would
constructivism attribute ethnic conflict to a Freudian “narcissism of small differences?” Political
entrepreneurs seek to shape or reconstruct the political identity of political groups. For example:
Russell Kirk published a work, The Conservative Mind (1953), that helped articulate and name
the conservative intellectual and political movement. Subsequently it has been shaped and
reshaped by various policy entrepreneurs, some of whom would have read him out of the
movement. Why is nonintervention a powerful norm of international law? Illustrate some of the
forms intervention may take, as in the case of economic assistance, electioneering, and the
sending of military advisers? What makes intervention hard to define? (153-59)

2.

Sovereignty, Judging Intervention Under the Westphalian (1648) system, what are
some of the factors that set practical limits on sovereignty? How do realists,
cosmopolitans, and state moralists differ in their views of intervention? Which school of
thought is most apt to support humanitarian intervention? What were the Brezhnev
Doctrine [the Soviet Union committed itself to prevent any parts of its empire from
seceding or being overthrown] and the Reagan Doctrine? A book entitled Reagan’s War
argues that Ronald Reagan made the defeat of Communism the central goal of his
Administration, capping his own decades-long struggle against Communism in Hollywood
and public life. (159-61)

3.

Exceptions to the Rule Identify Michael Walzer’s four situations in which war or military
intervention may be justified. What are some of the strengths and weaknesses of these
arguments? (161-62)

4.

Problems of Self-Determination What are some of the problems with intervention on
behalf of secessionist movements? Why is the question of voting (in a plebiscite) so
complicated? Why did Biafra’s secession (1967-1970) create a problem for the rest of
Nigeria? What factors complicated the issue of how to respond to ethnic cleansing in
Bosnia? Why then is self-determination “an ambiguous moral principle?” (162-64)

5.

Motives, Means, and Consequences What are the three dimensions of judgment
associated with the just war tradition? Why did George Kennan become disillusioned
with containment? (158-61)

6.

Domestic Analogies, Predictability and Legitimacy Why is international organization
not an incipient world government? How does international law differ from domestic law,
especially regarding enforcement and adjudication? Why are states interested in
international law? (165-69)

7.

The Suez Canal Crisis What precipitated the Suez Canal Crisis in 1956? What efforts
were made to solve the problem peacefully? How and why did Israel get involved? What
role was played by the United Nations? What is the purpose of U.N. Security Council
Resolution 242? (169-71)

8.

U.N. Peacekeeping and Collective Security Identify some of the formal steps taken in
the development of international law and collective security? How does the U.N. Security
Council work? What are some of the difficulties in defining aggression? What is
preventive diplomacy? Why was U.N. collective security used in 1990 for the first time
since the Korean War? What are some of the remaining practical limitations on collective
security? (171-74)

9.

Conflicts in the Middle East Identify three factors at the root of so much Middle East
conflict? What miscalculations led to the Iran-Iraq War? (174-75)

10.

The Questions of Nationalism How may “nation” be defined? What are the
implications of the word being both descriptive and prescriptive? How did this idea arise
and spread? How has decolonization changed the nineteenth century model? What role
has been played by the “pan” movements? (175-77)

11.

The Arab-Israeli Conflicts Identify the six wars produced by the Arab-Israeli conflict.
What are some of the ambiguities of Resolution 242? What was the superpower role in
the Yom Kippur War? Why were these wars generally short? (178-81)

12.

The 1991 Gulf War and Its Aftermath What reasons did Iraq have for invading Kuwait?
Why did the United States respond as it did? Was the war necessary? What did it
solve? How did it affect the Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian situation? The Wye River
Memorandum (1998) between Israel and the Palestinians was intended to facilitate
implementation of the Interim Agreement of 1995. It called upon each side to take
measures to guarantee the security of the other and provided for the phased transfer of
powers and authority from Israel to the Palestinian Authority in Gaza and the Jericho
area. What factors contributed to the breakdown of the peace process? (181-84)

13.

How did the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict change in 2000 and 2001? How did
the international context of the conflict change? What have been some of the effects of
Saddam Hussein’s removal from power? How do the three levels of analysis continue to
interact? (184-86)
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CHAPTER SEVEN: GLOBALIZATION AND INDEPENDENCE
Outline
A.

B.

C.

INTRODUCTION (191-92)
1.
Fault Line Between Those with Skills and Mobility and Those Without
2,
New Competition Among States in “Geo-Economics” [cf. Walter Russell Mead’s
millennial capitalism
THE DIMENSIONS OF GLOBALIZATION (192-94)
1.
Globalization: Worldwide Networks of Interdependence
a.
It does not imply universality
2.
It Has Made National Boundaries More Porous
a.
Homogenization does not follow from globalization
3.
Three Dimensions:
4.
Environmental
a.
Smallpox
b.
Black Death
c.
HIV/AIDS
d.
Exotic flora and fauna
e.
Global climate change
5.
Military
a.
World-straddling alliances
b.
Missiles
6.
Social
a.
American population
b.
Four great world religions
c.
Spread of constitutional arrangements and political ideas
WHAT’S NEW ABOUT TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY GLOBALIZATION? (194-95)
1.
Network Effects
a.
Joseph Stiglitz: Spillover Effects
2.
Thickness
3.
Quickness
4.
Direct Public Participation
a.
Pluralization

Study Questions
1.

Dimensions of Globalization What is meant by “geo-economics”? Why does
globalization not imply universality? Identify its three chief dimensions. What is
happening with the pace of environmental change? What are some of the features of
political globalization? (191-94)

2.

Identify four effects of contemporary globalization that reveal it to be “farther, faster,
cheaper and deeper,” according to Thomas Friedman. What is some of the evidence of
increasing inequality between people in the richest countries and people in the poorest?
[In The Wealth and Poverty of Nations (1998), David S. Landes, a Harvard economic
historian, maintained that the income difference between Switzerland and Madagascar is
about 400:1]. What have been some of the effects of the market forces unleashed by the
Industrial Revolution? What is meant by “useful inefficiencies”? (194-97)

3.

The Concept of Interdependence How do statesmen and analysts differ in their use of political
words? As an analytic word, what is interdependence? What are some sources of
interdependence? Why did the collapse of the Soviet bring relief in the West rather than cause
anxiety? Why did the cost of bread rise in the 1970s? What happened when the United States
decided in 1973 to stop exporting soybeans to Japan? Why is the distribution of benefits a “zerosum game”? Why does the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs become blurred?
Why does classical balance of power theory not fit economic interdependence very well? (197200)

4.

Distinguish between short-term sensitivity and long-term vulnerability. Identify three factors
involved by vulnerability. What was behind the error in Lester Brown’s prediction that the United
States would be dependent on imports of 10 of the basic 13 industrial raw materials by 1985?
When the United States became dependent on imported Japanese capital to balance its federal
budget in the 1980s, did this give Japan either a political or a trade advantage? How can
manipulation of asymmetries be a source of power in the politics of interdependence? What is
linkage? What are trade-offs? Even though Canada is more dependent on the United States
than vice versa, what accounts for its ability to prevail in a number of disputes between them?
What is the effect of pacts such as NAFTA? (200-205)

5.

Leadership in the World Economy Why did hegemony over the international economy shift
from Great Britain to the United States? What crisis occurred due to the American unwillingness
to live up to its new responsibilities? What are some of the key institutions of the post-WWII
international economic regime? How do the ideas of realism and complex interdependence
describe the US/China relationship?

6.

The Politics of Oil What were the characteristics of the international oil regime in 1960? What
changes were evident as a result of the Arab oil embargo of 1973? Describe three explanations
of the changes in the international oil regime. What are the particulars of each? Why was the oil
weapon not more effective? (205-13)
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CHAPTER EIGHT: THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION,
TRANSNATIONAL ACTORS, AND THE DIFFUSION OF
POWER
Study Questions
1.

Power and the Information Revolution Why have governments always worried about the flow
and control of information? How did Gutenberg’s invention of movable type change the world?
What is the key characteristic of the information revolution, which is sometimes called the Third
Industrial Revolution? What changes were wrought by the first two industrial revolutions?

What is meant by the management of scale? Why does productivity growth lag? What were the
political effects of mass communication and broadcasting? How and why have they changed?
(217-21)
2.

Sovereignty and Control What do Peter Drucker and the Tofflers mean by cyber-feudalism?
The term “cybernetics” -- which was introduced by the scientist and philosopher, Norbert Wiener,
in the 1940s -- is derived from the Greek root kubernetes [pilot or steersman], as governor is
derived from the Latin equivalent. What are the implications of the communications revolution for
national identity, loyalty, and sovereignty? What changed as a result of medieval trade fairs (e.g.,
Scarborough Fair)?
NOTE: Serfs who escaped to live and work in the medieval free cities won their freedom after a
year and a day: “Stadtluft macht frei” [city airs makes (one) free]. Hitler’s concentration camps
changed the slogan to “Arbeit macht frei” [work makes one free]. The lex mercatoria [merchant
or market law] was developed as a private set of rules, complete with courts, for conducting
business. In The Mystery of Capital, the Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto examines the
development of property protections on the American frontier and commends the American model
for land reform in Third World areas.
The ideas of complex interdependence and transnational actors are not at all new. Cf. Adda B.
Bozeman on the origins of the Hanseatic League in Politics and Culture in International History
(1960):

“The objective and subjective factors that had distinguished the Western
European approach to peace and unity in religious, political, and intellectual
matters, and had given rise, in consequence, to the permanent establishment of
the three great concerts or “virtues” of the Church, the Empire, and the University
of Paris, and the ad hoc assembling of all European interests at Constance were
operative also in the field of Europe’s economic life where they called forth a
remarkable movement toward federalism among the rising groups of townsmen
and merchants.”
“This impulse toward corporate unity was particularly strong north of the Alps,
where the absence of a protective secular international order was felt more
keenly than in Italy. Here, in the midst of political confusion, where travelling
merchants had long been in the habit of carrying their special merchant law with
them, and where cities had evolved their own law in protection of their special
peace, certain German towns recorded what may be the most suggestive
chapter in the annals of inter-European constitutionalism when they formed the
transterritorial League of Hanseatic cities.”
“The North European scene in which the German merchants operated before the
twelfth century . . . presented greater hazards and greater opportunities for
adventurous action than the southern region. East of the river Elbe spread the
vast territorial expanse of rural, pagan Slavdom. Here the pioneering merchants
are known to have conducted a border trade as early as the ninth century A.D.
This penetration, later supported by organized campaigns of colonization and
Christianization, brought the entering Germans into contact with local rulers
under whose protection they proceeded to found and build numerous towns.
Lübeck, renowned in later centuries as the leader of the Hanseatic League, was

the first of these settlements that pointed, chainlike, toward the magnetic market
of Novgorod. From the eastern ports of the “new” Germany the companies
pushed to the farthest Baltic coast, gained economic control over the Baltic Sea,
and established a direct route between these northern waters and the Black Sea
by traveling on the Oder or the Vistula to Cracow, and thence on the Pruth or
Dniester to their southern ports of destination.”
.
.
.
.
“The recognition granted the Germans abroad coincided with the constitutional
status that the trading companies had evolved for themselves, for all Germans
who were natives of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation were actually
organized at this time as universitas communium mercatorium. This first allGerman universitas, the predecessor of the Hanseatic League, united the
merchants of over thirty towns, from Cologne and Utrecht in the west to Reval in
the east, and had its headquarters on the island of Gotland, then known as the
axis and most celebrated market of Europe.” (505-06)
3.

How does the transition from the medieval to the modern political world illustrate the resistance,
slowness, or lag of political institutions in responding to change? Identify some of “the growing
list of problems that are difficult to control within sovereign borders.” How do competing
sovereignties affect border control, national security, and human rights? How have human rights
issues effectively modified the UN rule against intervention? How do cross-cutting identities
(like “cross-cutting cleavages”) and cosmopolitan identities complicate the existing mix of
loyalties? How have diaspora communities (exiles, such as the Iraqis in America who voted in
the 2005 election) used Internet to stay politically involved with their home country? What are
“flash movements” and James Rosenau’s “fragmegration?” (221-25)

4.

What are transnational actors? How do they add to the blurring of foreign and domestic politics
even within the bureaucracy? What economic interests in America were not unhappy that OPEC
raised oil prices? What is one of the distinguishing characteristics if complex interdependence?
Give some examples of NGOs. Define terrorism. How does it compare with piracy in an earlier
era? How important is the role of states? (225-231)

5.

Information and Power among States Does the information revolution tend to equalize power
among nations? What trends aid the already large and powerful? What is meant by the “paradox
of plenty?” What does the author mean when he writes: “Now credibility is the crucial resource,”
and “Politics has become a contest of competitive credibility?”
Why are most information shapers democracies? Why are closed systems more costly? What
conclusions does the author draw about the information revolution? (231-38)
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CHAPTER NINE: A NEW WORLD ORDER?

Outline
A.

B.

C.

D.

ALTERNATIVE DESIGNS FOR THE FUTURE (242-47)
1.
Self-Help Realm
2.
Arnold Toynbee: Nation-State vs. Fission
3.
Large Territorial State as the Post-Westphalian Norm
4.
Five Alternatives
a.
World Federalism
b.
Functionalism
c.
Regionalism: Jean Monnet, Schumann Plan, Treaty of Rome (EU)
d.
Ecologism: Richard Falk
e.
Cyber-Feudalism: Peter Drucker, the Tofflers, Esther Dyson
(1)
Crosscutting Communities
(2)
Terrorists
(3)
Thomas Hobbes
5.
Political Goals: Physical Security, Economic Well-Being, Communal Identity
6.
Changing Context
a.
Divisiveness: Religious and Nationalistic Cleavages
b.
Economic Integration vs. Political Fragmentation
7.
Communications and Diplomacy
a.
CNN
b.
Synchronization
8.
“Narrowcasting” of Information
a.
Marshall McLuhan’s Global Village
THE END OF HISTORY OR THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS? (247-49)
1.
Francis Fukuyama’s End of History
a.
Deep Ideological Cleavages
b.
Success of Liberal Capitalism
c.
Post-Cold War Return of History
2.
Samuel P. Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations
a.
Toynbee’s Civilizations
3.
Critique
4.
Nationalism
5.
East vs. West Europe
6.
Explanations
a.
Role of Economic Growth
b.
Democratic Processes
c.
Regional Institutions
7.
Persistence of National Identity
a.
French and Germans
b.
Immigration
c.
Sovereignty
TECHNOLOGY AND THE DIFFUSION OF POWER (249-51)
1.
Diffusion of Power
a.
Erosion of Control
b.
Trends
2.
Consequences
a.
Islands of Democratic Peace vs. a New Feudalism
3.
Benign Vision: NGOs
4.
MNCs
5.
Confusion of Identity
6.
Protectionism
PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (251-53)
1.
Malign Vision
a.
WMDs
b.
Proliferation

2.
3.

E.

F.

G.

H.

I.

J.

Nuclear Club
Cold War Obstacles to Nuclear Proliferation
a.
Cold War Alliance Structure
b.
Superpower Cooperation
(1)
Nuclear Suppliers Group
c.
Treaties and Institutions
(1)
India Cheated
4.
Collapse of Soviet Alliance Guarantees
TRANSNATIONAL THREATS AND THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY (253-54)
1.
“Failsafe” Devices
a.
Volatility of Proliferation
b.
Fissile Materials
2.
Biological Agents
3.
Transnational Terrorism
a.
Aum Shinriko
4.
“Netwars”
5.
Inadequacy of Deterrence
a.
State Terrorism
b.
Panama’s Manuel Noriega
A NEW WORLD ORDER? (254-55)
1.
Order
a.
Realists
b.
Liberals
c.
Constructivists
2.
Conspiracy Theories
3.
Lack of Definition
FUTURE CONFIGURATIONS OF POWER (255-57)
1.
Rapid Power Transitions
2.
Multipolarity
3.
Unipolar Hegemony
a.
Tripolar Economic Power
4.
Transnational Relations
5.
Three Economic Blocs: Europe, Asia, North America
6.
Multilevel Interdependence
7.
No American Hegemony
THE PRISON OF OLD CONCEPTS (257-59)
1.
Sui Generis [Self-Generating] System
2.
Realist View
a.
Erosion of Classical Conception
3.
Liberal View
4.
Security Council and the Doctrine of Collective Security
5.
Unforeseen Rise of Bipolarity
6.
Issue of Self-Determination
THE EVOLUTION OF A HYBRID WORLD ORDER (259-60)
1.
Human Rights
a.
Sanctions against South Africa
b.
Helsinki Accords
2.
Armed Multilateral Intervention
3.
U. N. Charter, Chapter VII
4.
What Realists and Liberals Must Recognize
THINKING ABOUT THE FUTURE (260-61)
1.
Change
a.
Thucydides
b.
Kant
2.
Thinking about Different Ideal Types

Study Questions
1.

Why did Arnold Toynbee believe that the nation-state and the split atom could not coexist on the
same planet? Identify five alternative futures. What do people want from their political
institutions? How is the context of world politics changing? What is meant by “narrowcasting”?
(238-43)

2.

Compare and contrast the theories of Francis Fukuyama and Samuel P. Huntington. What are
some of the criticisms? How does the author account for the virtual absence of intrastate conflict
in Europe? Is nationalism dead in Europe? (243-45)

3.

What third vision of the future does the author offer? Compare the benign with the malign vision?
How is transnational investment [Mead’s millennial capitalism] helping to confuse identities?
What were the chief obstacles to nuclear proliferation during the Cold War? Why is deterrence
inadequate to protect from terrorist threats? What then is required? (245-50)

4.

At a time of rapid power transitions, what future scenarios are usually invoked? In “The Prison of
Old Concepts,” what does the author find salvageable? What does he mean by a “hybrid world
order”? Why must we understand both the realist and the liberal views of world politics? (25056)
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large territorial state and the five alternatives
Richard Falk
what people want from their political institutions
economic integration and political fragmentation
Francis Fukuyama
Samuel P. Huntington
East vs. West Europe
diffusion of power
Marshall McLuhan
Cold War obstacles to nuclear proliferation
rapid power transitions
future configurations of power

